Sandinista National Liberation Front



The Sandinista National Liberation Front (Spanish: Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional, or FSLN) is a Democratic socialist political party in Nicaragua. Its members are called Sandinistas in both English and Spanish. The party is named after Augusto César Sandino who led the Nicaraguan resistance against the United States occupation of Nicaragua in the 1930s.

The FSLN overthrew Anastasio Somoza Debayle in 1979, ending the Somoza dynasty, and established a revolutionary government in its place.[1] [2] Following their seizure of power, the Sandinistas ruled Nicaragua from 1979 to 1990, first as part of a Junta of National Reconstruction. Following the resignation of centrist members from this Junta, the FSLN took exclusive power in March 1981. They instituted a policy of mass literacy, devoted significant resources to health care, and promoted gender equality.[3] Oppositional militias, known as Contras, formed in 1981 to resist the Sandinista's Junta and received support from the American Central Intelligence Agency. The 1984 elections, described by international observers as fair and free[4], were nevertheless boycotted by the main opposition. The FSLN won the majority of the votes.[5] Those who did oppose the Sandinistas won approximately a third of the seats. Despite the clear electoral victory for the Sandinistas, the Contras continued their violent attacks on both state and civilian targets, until 1989. The FSLN lost elections in 1990 to Violeta Barrios de Chamorro, after revising the constitution in 1987 and after years of resisting the United States-supported Contras, but they retained a plurality of seats in the legislature.

The FSLN remains one of Nicaragua's two leading parties. The FSLN often polls in opposition to the Constitutional Liberal Party, or PLC. In the 2006 Nicaraguan general election, former FSLN President Daniel Ortega was re-elected President of Nicaragua with 38.7% of the vote compared to 29% for his leading rival, bringing in the country's second Sandinista government after 16 years of the opposition winning elections. The Sandinistas took their name from Augusto César Sandino (1895–1934), the charismatic and historical leader of Nicaragua's nationalist rebellion against the US occupation of the country during the early 20th century (ca. 1922 - 1934). Sandino was assassinated in 1934 by the National Guard (Guardia Nacional), the US-equipped police force of Anastasio Somoza, whose family ruled the country from 1936 until they were overthrown by the Sandinistas in 1979.

[edit] Founding, 1961–1970
The FSLN originated in the milieu of student and Marxist groups in the late 1950s and early 1960s. The University of Léon, and the National Autonomous University of Nicaragua (UNAN) in Managua were two of the principal centers of activity.[6] The FSLN itself was founded in 1961 by Carlos Fonseca, Silvio Mayorga, Tomás Borge and others as The National Liberation Front (FLN).[7] Only Tomás Borge lived long enough to see the Sandinista victory in 1979.

The term "Sandinista", was added two years later, establishing continuity with Sandino's movement, and using his legacy in order to develop the newer movement's ideology and strategy.[8] By the early 1970s, the FSLN was launching limited military initiatives.[9]

[edit] Rise, 1970-1976
On December 23, 1972, a powerful earthquake leveled the capital city, Managua. The earthquake killed 10,000 of the city's 400,000 residents and left another 50,000 homeless.[10] About 80% of Managua's commercial buildings were destroyed.[11] President Anastasio Somoza Debayle's National Guard embezzled much of the international aid that flowed into the country to assist in reconstruction,[12] [13] and several parts of downtown Managua were never rebuilt. The president gave reconstruction contracts preferentially to family and friends, thereby profiting from the quake and inceasing his control of the city's economy. By some estimates, his personal wealth soared to US$400 million in 1974.[14]

In December 1974, a guerrilla group affiliated with FSLN seized government hostages at a party in the house of the Minister of Agriculture in the Managua suburb Los Robles, among them several leading Nicaraguan officials and Somoza relatives. The siege was carefully timed for after the departure of the US ambassador from the gathering. At 10:50 pm, a group of 15 young guerrillas and their commanders, Pomares and Contreras, entered the house. They killed the Minister, who tried to shoot them, during the takeover.[9] The guerrillas received US$2 million ransom, and had their official communiqué read over the radio and printed in the newspaper La Prensa.

Over the next year, the guerrillas also succeeded in getting 14 Sandinista prisoners released from jail, and with them, were flown to Cuba. One of the released prisoners was Daniel Ortega, who would later become the president of Nicaragua (1985–1990)[15]. The group also lobbied for an increase in wages for National Guard soldiers to 500 córdobas ($71 at the time).<sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-15">[16] The Somoza government responded with further censorship, intimidation, torture, and murder.<sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-autogenerated2_16-0">[17]

In 1975, Somoza imposed a state of siege, censoring the press, and threatening all opponents with internment and torture.<sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-autogenerated2_16-1">[17] Somoza's National Guard also increased its violence against individuals and communities suspected of collaborating with the Sandinistas. Many of the FSLN guerrillas were killed, including its leader and founder Carlos Fonseca in 1976. Fonseca had returned to Nicaragua in 1975 from his exile in Cuba to try to reunite fractures that existed in the FSLN. He and his group were betrayed by a peasant who informed the National Guard that they were in the area. The guerrilla group was ambushed, and Fonseca was wounded in the process. The next morning Fonseca was executed by the National Guard.<sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-17">[18]

[edit] Split, 1977-1978
Following the FSLN's defeat at the battle of Pancasán in 1967, the organization adopted the "Prolonged Popular War" (Guerra Popular Prolongada, GPP) theory as its strategic doctrine. The GPP was based on the "accumulation of forces in silence": while the urban organization recruited on the university campuses and collected funds through bank holdups, the main cadres were to go permanently to the north central mountain zone. There they would build a grassroots peasant support base in preparation for renewed rural guerrilla warfare.<sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-18">[19]

As a consequence of the repressive campaign of the National Guard, in 1975 a group within the FSLN's urban mobilization arm began to question the viability of the GPP. In the view of the young orthodox Marxist intellectuals, such as Jaime Wheelock, economic development had turned Nicaragua into a nation of factory workers and wage-earning farm laborers.<sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-wheelock_19-0">[20] Wheelock's faction was known as the "Proletarian Tendency".

Shortly after, a third faction arose within the FSLN. The "Insurrectional Tendency", also known as the "Third Way" or Terceristas, led by Daniel Ortega and his brother Humberto Ortega, was more pragmatic and called for tactical, temporary alliances with non-communists, including the right-wing opposition, in a popular front against the Somoza regime.<sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-ortega_20-0">[21] By attacking the Guard directly, the Terceristas would demonstrate the weakness of the regime and encourage others to take up arms.

In October 1977, a group of prominent Nicaraguan professionals, business leaders, and clergymen allied with the Terceristas to form "El Grupo de los Doce", (The Group of Twelve) in Costa Rica. The group's main idea was to organize a provisional government from Costa Rica.<sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-21">[22] The new strategy of the Terceristas also included unarmed strikes and rioting by labor and student groups coordinated by the FSLN's "United People's Movement" (Movimiento Pueblo Unido - MPU).

[edit] 1978 Insurrection
On January 10, 1978, Pedro Joaquín Chamorro, the popular editor of the opposition newspaper La Prensa and leader of the "Democratic Union of Liberation" (Unión Democrática de Liberación - UDEL), was assassinated. Although his assassins were not identified at the time, evidence implicated President Somoza's son and other members of the National Guard.<sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-22">[23] Spontaneous riots followed in several cities, while the business community organized a general strike demanding Somoza's resignation.

The Terceristas joined the turmoil in early February with attacks in several Nicaraguan cities. The National Guard responded by further increasing repression and using force to contain and intimidate all government opposition. The nationwide strike that paralyzed the country for ten days weakened the private enterprises and most of them decided to suspend their participation in less than two weeks. Meanwhile, Somoza asserted his intention to stay in power until the end of his presidential term in 1981. The United States government showed its displeasure with Somoza by suspending all military assistance to the regime, but continued to approve economic assistance to the country for humanitarian reasons.<sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-23">[24]

In August, the Terceristas staged a spectacular hostage-taking. Twenty-three Tercerista commandos led by Edén Pastora seized the entire Nicaraguan congress and took nearly 1,000 hostages including Somoza's nephew José Somoza Abrego and cousin Luis Pallais Debayle. Somoza gave in to their demands and paid a $500,000 ransom, released 59 political prisoners (including GPP chief Tomás Borge), broadcasted a communiqué with FSLN's call for general insurrection and gave the guerrillas safe passage to Panama.<sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-24">[25]

A few days later six Nicaraguan cities rose in revolt. Armed youths took over the highland city of Matagalpa. Tercerista cadres attacked Guard posts in Managua, Masaya, León, Chinandega and Estelí. Large numbers of semi-armed civilians joined the revolt and put the Guard garrisons of the latter four cities under siege. The September Insurrection of 1978 was subdued at the cost of several thousand, mostly civilian, casualties.<sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-Univ._of_Minnesota.2C_cit_Red_Cross_Rep._25-0">[26] Members of all three factions fought in these uprisings, which began to blur the divisions and prepare the way for unified action.<sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-RevNicaragua_26-0">[27]

[edit] Reunification, 1979
In early 1979, President Jimmy Carter and the United States no longer supported the Somoza regime, but did not want a left-wing government to take power in Nicaragua. The moderate "Broad Opposition Front" (Frente Amplio Oppositor - FAO) which opposed Somoza was made up of a conglomeration of dissidents within the government as well as the "Democratic Union of Liberation" (UDEL) and the "Twelve", representatives of the Terceristas. The FAO and Carter came up with a plan that would remove Somoza from office but left no part in government power for the FSLN.<sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-pastor_27-0">[28] The FAO's efforts lost political legitimacy, as Nicaraguans protested that they did not want "Somocismo sin Somoza" (Somocism without Somoza).<sup class="Template-Fact" style="white-space: nowrap;" title="This claim needs references to reliable sources from April 2010">[citation needed]

The "Twelve" abandoned the coalition in protest and formed the "National Patriotic Front" (Frente Patriotico Nacional - FPN) together with the "United People's Movement" (MPU). This strengthened the revolutionary organizations as tens of thousands of youths joined the FSLN and the fight against Somoza. A direct consequence of the spread of the armed struggle in Nicaragua was the official reunification of the FSLN that took place on 7 March 1979. Nine men, three from each tendency, formed the National Directorate which would lead the reunited FSLN. They were: Daniel Ortega, Humberto Ortega and Víctor Tirado (Terceristas); Tomás Borge, Bayardo Arce, and Henry Ruiz (GPP faction); and Jaime Wheelock, Luis Carrión and Carlos Núñez.<sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-RevNicaragua_26-1">[27]

[edit] Nicaraguan Revolution
Main article: Nicaraguan RevolutionThe FSLN evolved from one of many opposition groups to a leadership role in the overthrow of the Somoza regime. By mid-April 1979, five guerrilla fronts opened under the joint command of the FSLN, including an internal front in the capital city Managua. Young guerrilla cadres and the National Guardsmen were clashing almost daily in cities throughout the country. The strategic goal of the Final Offensive was the division of the enemy's forces. Urban insurrection was the crucial element because the FSLN could never hope to achieve simple superiority in men and firepower over the National Guard.<sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-borge_28-0">[29]

On June 4, a general strike was called by the FSLN to last until Somoza fell and an uprising was launched in Managua. On June 16, the formation of a provisional Nicaraguan government in exile, consisting of a five-member Junta of National Reconstruction, was announced and organized in Costa Rica. The members of the new junta were Daniel Ortega (FSLN), Moisés Hassan (FPN), Sergio Ramírez (the "Twelve"), Alfonso Robelo (MDN) and Violeta Barrios de Chamorro, the widow of La Prensa's director Pedro Joaquín Chamorro. By the end of that month, with the exception of the capital, most of Nicaragua was under FSLN control, including León and Matagalpa, the two largest cities in Nicaragua after Managua.

On July 9, the provisional government in exile released a government program, in which it pledged to organize an effective democratic regime, promote political pluralism and universal suffrage, and ban ideological discrimination, except for those promoting the "return of Somoza's rule". On July 17, Somoza resigned, handed over power to Francisco Urcuyo, and fled to Miami. While initially seeking remain in power to serve out Somoza's presidential term, Urcuyo seceded his position to the junta and fled to Guatemala two days later.

On July 19, the FSLN army entered Managua, culminating the first goal of the Nicaraguan revolution. The war left approximately 50,000 dead and 150,000 Nicaraguans in exile. The five-member junta entered the Nicaraguan capital the next day and assumed power, reiterating its pledge to work for political pluralism, a mixed economic system, and a nonaligned foreign policy.<sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-29">[30]

[edit] Sandinista rule (1979–1990)
The Sandinistas inherited a country in ruins with a debt of 1.6 billion dollars (US), an estimated 50,000 war dead, 600,000 homeless, and a devastated economic infrastructure.<sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-30">[31] To begin the task of establishing a new government, they created a Council (or junta) of National Reconstruction, made up of five appointed members. Three of the appointed members belonged to FSLN, which included – Sandinista militants Daniel Ortega, Moises Hassan, and novelist Sergio Ramírez (a member of Los Doce "the Twelve"). Two opposition members, businessman Alfonso Robelo, and Violeta Barrios de Chamorro (the widow of Pedro Joaquín Chamorro), were also appointed. Only three votes were needed to pass law.

The FSLN also established a Council of State, subordinate to the junta, which was composed of representative bodies. However, the Council of State only gave political parties twelve of forty-seven seats, the rest of the seats were given to Sandinista mass-organizations.<sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-autogenerated3_31-0">[32] Of the twelve seats reserved for political parties, only three were not allied to the FSLN.<sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-autogenerated3_31-1">[32] Due to the rules governing the Council of State, in 1980 both non-FSLN junta members resigned. Nevertheless, as of the 1982 State of Emergency, opposition parties were no longer given representation in the council.<sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-autogenerated3_31-2">[32] The preponderance of power also remained with the Sandinistas through their mass organizations, including the Sandinista Workers' Federation (Central Sandinista de Trabajadores), the Luisa Amanda Espinoza Nicaraguan Women's Association (Asociación de Mujeres Nicaragüenses Luisa Amanda Espinoza), the National Union of Farmers and Ranchers (Unión Nacional de Agricultores y Ganaderos), and most importantly the Sandinista Defense Committees (CDS). The Sandinista controlled mass organizations were extremely influential over civil society and saw their power and popularity peak in the mid-1980s.<sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-autogenerated3_31-3">[32]

Upon assuming power, the FSLNs political platform included the following: nationalization of property owned by the Somozas and their supporters; land reform; improved rural and urban working conditions; free unionization for all workers, both urban and rural; price fixing for commodities of basic necessity; improved public services, housing conditions, education; abolition of torture<sup class="Template-Fact" style="white-space: nowrap;" title="This claim needs references to reliable sources from October 2008">[citation needed], political assassination<sup class="Template-Fact" style="white-space: nowrap;" title="This claim needs references to reliable sources from October 2008">[citation needed] and the death penalty; protection of democratic liberties; equality for women; non-aligned foreign policy; formation of a "popular army" under the leadership of the FSLN and Humberto Ortega.

The FSLN's literacy campaign, which saw teachers flood the countryside, is often noted as their greatest success<sup class="Template-Fact" style="white-space: nowrap;" title="This claim needs references to reliable sources from October 2008">[citation needed]. Within six months, half a million people had been taught rudimentary reading, bringing the national illiteracy rate down from over 50% to just under 12%. Over 100,000 Nicaraguans participated as literacy teachers. One of the stated aims of the literacy campaign was to create a literate electorate which would be able to make informed choices at the promised elections. The successes of the literacy campaign was recognized by UNESCO with the award of a Nadezhda Krupskaya International Prize.

The FSLN also created neighborhood groups similar to the Cuban Committees for the Defense of the Revolution, called Sandinista Defense Committees (Comités de Defensa Sandinista or CDS). Especially in the early days following the overthrow of Somoza, the CDS's served as de facto units of local governance. Their obligations included political education, the organization of Sandinista rallies, the distribution of food rations, organization of neighborhood/regional cleanup and recreational activities, and policing to control looting, and the apprehension of counter-revolutionaries. The CDS's organized civilian defense efforts against Contra activities and a network of intelligence systems in order to apprehend their supporters. These activities led critics of the Sandinistas to argue that the CDS was a system of local spy networks for the government used to stifle political dissent, and it is true that the CDS did hold limited powers—such as the ability to suspend privileges such as driver licenses and passports—if locals refused to cooperate with the new government. After the initiation of full-scale U.S. military involvement in the Nicaraguan conflict the CDS was empowered to enforce wartime bans on political assembly and association with other political parties (i.e. parties associated with the "Contras").<sup class="Template-Fact" style="white-space: nowrap;" title="This claim needs references to reliable sources from March 2008">[citation needed]

By 1980, conflicts began to emerge between the Sandinista and non-Sandinista members of the governing junta. Violeta Chamorro and Alfonso Robelo resigned from the governing junta in 1980, and rumours began that members of the Ortega junta would consolidate power amongst themselves. These allegations spread, and rumors intensified that it was Ortega's goal to turn Nicaragua into a state modeled after Cuban Socialism. In 1979 and 1980, former Somoza supporters and ex-members of Somoza's National Guard formed irregular military forces, while the original core of the FSLN began to splinter. Armed opposition to the Sandinista Government eventually divided into two main groups: The Fuerza Democrática Nicaragüense (FDN), a U.S. supported army formed in 1981 by the CIA, U.S. State Department, and former members of the widely condemned Somoza-era Nicaraguan National Guard; and the Alianza Revolucionaria Democratica (ARDE) Democratic Revolutionary Alliance, a group that had existed since before the FSLN and was led by Sandinista founder and former FSLN supreme commander, Edén Pastora, a.k.a. "Commander Zero".<sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-32">[33] and Milpistas, former anti-Somoza rural militias, which eventually formed the largest pool of recruits for the Contras. Although independent and often at conflict with each other, these guerrilla bands—along with a few others—all became generally known as "Contras" (short for "contrarrevolucionarios", en. "counter-revolutionaries").<sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-33">[34]

The opposition militias were initially organized and largely remained segregated according to regional affiliation and political backgrounds. They conducted attacks on economic, military, and civilian targets. During the Contra war, the Sandinistas arrested suspected members of the Contra militias and censored publications they accused of collaborating with the enemy (i.e. the U.S., the FDN, and ARDE, among others).

[edit] 1982 – 1988 State of Emergency
In March 1982 the Sandinistas declared an official State of Emergency. They argued that this was a response to attacks by counter-revolutionary forces.<sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-Prevost_153_34-0">[35] The State of Emergency lasted six years, until January 1988, when it was lifted.

Under the new "Law for the Maintenance of Order and Public Security" the "Tribunales Populares Anti-Somozistas" allowed for the indefinite holding of suspected counter-revolutionaries without trial. The State of Emergency, however, most notably affected rights and guarantees contained in the "Statute on Rights and Guarantees of Nicaraguans.<sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-reds_35-0">[36] Many civil liberties were curtailed or canceled such as the freedom to organize demonstrations, the inviolability of the home, freedom of the press, freedom of speech and, the freedom to strike.<sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-reds_35-1">[36]

All independent news program broadcasts were suspended. In total, twenty-four programs were cancelled. In addition, Sandinista censor Nelba Cecilia Blandón issued a decree ordering all radio stations to hook up every six hours to government radio station, La Voz de La Defensa de La Patria.<sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-autogenerated5_36-0">[37]

The rights affected also included certain procedural guarantees in the case of detention including habeas corpus.<sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-reds_35-2">[36] The State of Emergency was not lifted during the 1984 elections. There were many instances where rallies of opposition parties were physically broken up by Sandinsta youth or pro-Sandinista mobs. Opponents to the State of Emergency argued its intent was to crush resistance to the FSLN. James Wheelock justified the actions of the Directorate by saying "... We are annulling the license of the false prophets and the oligarchs to attack the revolution."<sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-envio53_37-0">[38] On October 5, 1985 the Sandinistas broadened the 1982 State of Emergency and suspended many more civil rights. A new regulation also forced any organization outside of the government to first submit any statement it wanted to make public to the censorsip bureau for prior censorship.<sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-38">[39] Notably, emergency measures were already in place before 1982 under the FSLN. In December 1979 special courts called "Tribunales Especiales" were established to process trial of ex-Guardia and Contra rebels. These courts operated through relaxed rules of evidence and due process and were often staffed by new law students and inexperienced lawyers. Under these courts, up to 8,000 ex-Guardia members were tried. By 1986 only 2157 remained in incarceration, out of these, only 39 were left alive by 1989.<sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-autogenerated5_36-1">[37]

[edit] Sandinistas vs. Contras
Main articles: Contras and Iran-Contra affairUpon assuming office in 1981, U.S. President Ronald Reagan condemned the FSLN for joining with Cuba in supporting Marxist revolutionary movements in other Latin American countries such as El Salvador. His administration authorized the CIA to begin financing, arming and training rebels, most of whom were the remnants of Somoza's National Guard, as anti-Sandinista guerrillas that were branded "counter-revolutionary" by leftists (contrarrevolucionarios in Spanish).<sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-CA_39-0">[40] This was shortened to Contras, a label the anti-Communist forces chose to embrace. Edén Pastora and many of the indigenous guerrilla forces, who were not associated with the "Somozistas", also resisted the Sandinistas.

The Contras operated out of camps in the neighboring countries of Honduras to the north and Costa Rica (see Edén Pastora cited below) to the south. As was typical in guerrilla warfare, they were engaged in a campaign of economic sabotage in an attempt to combat the Sandinista government and disrupted shipping by planting underwater mines in Nicaragua's Corinto harbour,<sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-40">[41] an action condemned by the World Court as illegal. The U.S. also sought to place economic pressure on the Sandinistas, and, as with Cuba, the Reagan administration imposed a full trade embargo.<sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-41">[42]

The armed resistance to the Sandinistas in Costa Rica initially called itself the Nicaraguan Revolutionary Democratic Alliance (ADREN) and was known as the 15th of September Legion. It later formed an alliance, called the Nicaraguan Democratic Force (FDN), which comprised other groups including MISURASATA and the Nicaraguan Democratic Union. Together, the members of these groups were generally called Contras. The Sandinistas condemned them as terrorists, and human rights organizations expressed serious concerns about the nature and frequency of Contra attacks on civilians. In 1982, the Congress, passed the Boland Amendment. This meant the US could no longer openly support the Contras with U.S. government funds.

After the U.S. Congress prohibited federal funding of the Contras in 1983, the Reagan administration continued to back the Contras by raising money from foreign allies and covertly selling arms to Iran (then engaged in a vicious war with Iraq, and channelling the proceeds to the Contras (see the Iran-Contra Affair).<sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-42">[43] When this scheme was revealed, Reagan admitted that he knew about Iranian "arms for hostages" dealings but professed ignorance about the proceeds funding the Contras; for this, National Security Council aide Lt. Col. Oliver North took much of the blame.

Senator John Kerry's 1988 U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations report on links between the Contras and drug imports to the US concluded that "senior U.S. policy makers were not immune to the idea that drug money was a perfect solution to the Contras' funding problems."<sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-43">[44] According to the National Security Archive, Oliver North had been in contact with Manuel Noriega, the US-backed president of Panama. The Reagan administration's support for the Contras continued to stir controversy well into the 1990s. In August 1996, San Jose Mercury News reporter Gary Webb published a series titled Dark Alliance,<sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-44">[45] linking the origins of crack cocaine in California (largely aimed at its African-American population) to the CIA-Contra alliance. Freedom of Information Act inquiries by the National Security Archive and other investigators unearthed a number of documents showing that White House officials, including Oliver North, knew about and supported using money raised via drug trafficking to fund the Contras. Sen. John Kerry's report in 1988 led to the same conclusions. However, the Justice Department denied the allegations, and the mainstream US media downplayed them.

The Contra war unfolded differently in the northern and southern zones of Nicaragua. Contras based in Costa Rica operated on Nicaragua's Atlantic coast, which is sparsely populated by indigenous groups including the Miskito, Sumo, Rama, Garifuna, and Mestizo. Unlike Spanish-speaking western Nicaragua, the Atlantic Coast is predominantly English-speaking and was largely ignored by the Somoza regime. The costeños did not participate in the uprising against Somoza and viewed Sandinismo with suspicion from the outset.

[edit] American funding and the Iran/Contra Affair
Main article: Iran–Contra affair The FDN’s (Fuerza Democrática Nicaragüense, the main opposition group of those armed organizations referred to as 'Contras') chief of intelligence, Ricardo Lau, had, according to the former Salvadoran intelligence chief Col. Roberto Santivanez, ‘received payment of $120,000’ for organizing the murder of Archbishop Romero of El Salvador in 1980. The fact that a high contra official had executed the archbishop of El Salvador did not diminish the White House’s zeal for its fledgling ‘democratic resistance’.”<sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-45">[46] This habit of supporting a movement and then refusing to stand up when the mess is supposed to be cleaned up wasn’t new for the USG, they did the same when they built the Somocista National Guard and selected its chief to then step back and deny responsibility for its own creation and its human rights abuses. The US did something similar to the Kurds during the 1991 uprisings in Iraq.

Like Gilbert, Cockburn writes about the infamous manual issued to the contras by the CIA. She writes that the CIA was encouraging Contra terror and then indirectly by the U.S. government and President Reagan, violating Reagan’s own Presidential Directive. “The manual, Psychological Operations in Guerrilla Warfare, clearly advocated a strategy of terror as the means to victory over the hearts and minds of Nicaraguans. Chapter headings such as ‘Selective Use of Violence for propagandistic Effects’ and ‘Implicit and Explicit Terror’ made that fact clear enough...The little booklet thus violated President Reagan’s own Presidential Directive 12333, signed in December 1981, which prohibited any U.S. government employee-including the CIA-from having anything to do with assassinations.”<sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-46">[47] The manual was, according to Dennis Gilbert “apparently part of an effort [by the C.I.A.] to persuade the contras to use terror in a less random, more calculated fashion.” Whether they became more calculated regarding their deeds of terror is unclear, but they remained horrific: “[Benjamin] Linder was out with his crew, knee deep in a stream, measuring the water flow to see whether it was suitable to power a plant for San José de Bocay. Five grenades suddenly exploded around him and his helpers, followed by gunfire. One of the grenades wounded Linder, and as he lay there a contra came up and blew his brains out...’[my son Ben was killed] by somebody paid by somebody paid by somebody paid by President Reagan.’”<sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-Cockburn.2C_pp_249_47-0">[48] Linder’s father has a valid point since Reagan himself had stated “I’m a contra too”,<sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-Cockburn.2C_pp_249_47-1">[48] compared the contras with the founding fathers and the people in the French resistance, and then spent the money, $100 million in military aid<sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-48">[49] issued just in 1986 to the contras. There is more: “It was December 24, 1984. My son and his girlfriend had celebrated their wedding at 6 p.m...They took seven bodies out of the truck...three were children-Yolanda’s daughters, twelve, thirteen and fourteen years old.”<sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-49">[50]

With this in mind, Cockburn’s claim seems valid: “The U.S. problem with the contras was that they were by and large the very same group who had been trained by the United States to protect the interests of the Somozas. Methods and techniques developed for a ruthless dictatorship already in power are not necessarily the best way to create a popular insurgency.”<sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-50">[51]

The strong ties to Somoza decreased the potential to gain domestic support for the FDN, and prevented the U.S. guided unification operation, UNO: “The contra war had to be sold to Congress and the public as the struggle of an opposition united against the regime in Managua.”<sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-Cockburn.2C_pp_23_51-0">[52] The revolutionary hero and commander of the contra force of southern Nicaragua ARDE (Nicaraguan Democratic Revolutionary Alliance), Eden Pastora, refused to cooperate with the FDN. When it comes to Pastora, we can see two contrasting images. Pardo-Maurer writes about a problem, a loose gun out of control, someone that has made himself a lot of enemies. “Pastora, who cherished his independence, was perceived as the biggest obstacle to this plan [the unification under UNO]. His maverick vision made all his alliances unstable, ultimately costing him the support of his commanders... Everybody had an interest in getting rid of Pastora: his commanders, the Americans, the Sandinistas, the other contras.”<sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-52">[53] In contrast, Cockburn is writing about a very likable man, independent and true to his ideals. “He [Pastora] was a larger-than-life figure, handsome, provocative, and difficult to pin down. However, while adamantine in his opposition to the Sandinistas, he absolutely refused to have anything to do with the much larger contra group in Honduras, the FDN. The FDN was controlled by former ‘Somocista’ (as Pastora called them) officers and men of the infamous National Guard. Pastora had fought for years [even since the 60’s] against the Guardia, who were now enjoying the lavish support of the CIA.”<sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-Cockburn.2C_pp_23_51-1">[52] Pastora’s stubbornness/determination ultimately led to his officers being bribed to leave him, loss of his CIA support and an assassination attempt at his own press conference at La Penca in 1984.<sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-Cockburn.2C_pp_23_51-2">[52] According to Pastora, this happened because “we didn’t want to be CIA soldiers.”<sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-53">[54] The witness of Jack Terrell, a disillusioned American contra official corroborates this: “You’ve got the hierarchy of the FDN sitting there; you’ve got a representative, this guy Owen, from the NSC, CIA. So, you ask me if the U.S. government knew what was going on? They had to know from that meeting.”<sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-54">[55] Yet, U.S. interventionism reached further than favoring some contras while neutralizing others. In 1983 the CIA decided to create a group of “Unilaterally Controlled Latino Assets”. These UCLA’s would “sabotage ports, refineries, boats and bridges, and try to make it look like the contras had done it.”<sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-55">[56] In January 1984, these UCLA’s performed their most famous, or infamous, operation, the last straw that led to the ratifying of the Boland Amendment, the mining of several Nicaraguan harbors “The mines sank several Nicaraguan boats, damaged at least five foreign vessels, and brought an avalanche of international condemnation down on the United States. But from the administration’s point of view, the mines did their worst damage on Capitol Hill [the ratifying of the Boland Amendment].”<sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-56">[57] This time no one was under the illusion that it was a deed by the FDN, ironically the event came as a surprise for them as well. “The contras, it transpired, had been informed only after the fact of what the CIA was doing and were instructed to take credit. One contra leader was dragged from his bed at two a.m., handed a press release by a CIA contact, and told to read it over the contra radio before the Sandinistas broke the news.”<sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-57">[58] After the ratification of the Boland Amendment, the secret supply network directed by Lt. Col. North became active. “North had coordinated a secret contra supply operation from his office in the basement of the White House, in legal defiance of existing legislation but with the support of senior administration officials... North had also been deeply involved in shaping contra military and political strategy and in off-the-books schemes to pay for the supply flights and the munitions they carried. In Absence of Congressional appropriations, donations were gathered from private individuals and profits were diverted from the secret sales of arms to Iran. But the most significant unofficial funding for the contras came in the form of secret payments from conservative Third World governments solicited by senior American officials. Saudi Arabia alone contributed $32 million.”<sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-58">[59] However, Cockburn claims that the result of the supply network wasn’t military success but increased living standards for the contra leaders. “You’ve got estimates ranging between five thousand and thirty thousand tough contra soldiers on this border, yet they do not hold an inch of dirt. The only progress they’ve made is in purchasing condominiums... Why do you stop a war when people are getting very well off?”<sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-59">[60] This was corroborated by an aid to LT. Col. North: “ I’ve been in their accounting office. I’ve seen filing cabinets full of hundred-dollar bills, suitcases full of money... They were laundering money...These people don’t know they are even in a war, they think they are running a business.”<sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-60">[61] There are even sources that say some of the American weapons intended for the contra effort were sold by contra leaders on the black market to the leftist guerrilla in El Salvador. Which is ironic since the first reason for American interventionism with the Sandinistas was to prevent them to supply weapons to the Salvadoran guerillas. It seems that the resources available to the contras was squandered, abused, and used for the personal gain of the leadership. And the resources that actually went all the way to the front line was used on civilian targets in bloody, meaningless acts of terror. The few, successful “contra” operations, such as the harbor mining, were performed by the CIA.

Oliver North came into the public spotlight as a result of his participation in the Iran-Contra affair, a political scandal of the late 1980s, in which he claimed partial responsibility for the sale of weapons via intermediaries to Iran, with the profits being channeled to the Contras in Nicaragua. He was reportedly responsible for the establishment of a covert network used for the purposes of aiding the Contras. U.S. funding of the Contras by appropriated funds spent by intelligence agencies had been prohibited by the Boland Amendment. Funding was facilitated through Palmer National Bank of Washington, D.C. It was founded in 1983 by Harvey McLean, Jr., a businessman from Shreveport, Louisiana. It was initially funded with $2.8 million dollars to McLean from Herman K. Beebe. Oliver North supposedly used this bank during the Iran-Contra scandal by funneling money from his shell organization, the "National Endowment for the Preservation of Liberty", through Palmer National Bank to the Contras.

According to the National Security Archive, in an August 23, 1986 e-mail to John Poindexter, Oliver North described a meeting with a representative of Panamanian President Manuel Noriega: "You will recall that over the years Manuel Noriega in Panama and I have developed a fairly good relationship", North writes before explaining Noriega's proposal. If U.S. officials can "help clean up his image" and lift the ban on arms sales to the Panamanian Defense Force, Noriega will "'take care of' the Sandinista leadership for us."<sup class="Template-Fact" style="white-space: nowrap;" title="This claim needs references to reliable sources from April 2010">[citation needed]

North tells Poindexter that Noriega can assist with sabotage against the Sandinistas, and supposedly suggests paying Noriega a million dollars cash; from "Project Democracy" funds raised from the sale of U.S. arms to Iran – for the Panamanian leader's help in destroying Nicaraguan economic installations.<sup class="Template-Fact" style="white-space: nowrap;" title="This claim needs references to reliable sources from April 2010">[citation needed]

In November 1986 as the sale of weapons was made public, North was fired by President Ronald Reagan, and in July 1987 he was summoned to testify before televised hearings of a joint Congressional committee formed to investigate Iran-Contra. The image of North taking the oath became iconic, and similar photographs made the cover of Time and Newsweek, and helped define him in the eyes of the public.<sup class="Template-Fact" style="white-space: nowrap;" title="This claim needs references to reliable sources from April 2010">[citation needed] During the hearings, North admitted that he had lied to Congress, for which he was later charged among other things. He defended his actions by stating that he believed in the goal of aiding the Contras, whom he saw as freedom fighters, and said that he viewed the Iran-Contra scheme as a "neat idea."<sup class="Template-Fact" style="white-space: nowrap;" title="This claim needs references to reliable sources from April 2010">[citation needed]

North was tried in 1988 in relation to his activities while at the National Security Council. He was indicted on sixteen felony counts and on May 4, 1989, he was initially convicted of three: accepting an illegal gratuity, aiding and abetting in the obstruction of a congressional inquiry, and destruction of documents (by his secretary, Fawn Hall, on his instructions). He was sentenced by U.S. District Judge Gerhard A. Gesell on July 5, 1989, to a three-year suspended prison term, two years probation, $150,000 in fines, and 1,200 hours community service.

However, on July 20, 1990, with the help of the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU),<sup class="Template-Fact" style="white-space: nowrap;" title="This claim needs references to reliable sources from April 2010">[citation needed] North's convictions were vacated, after the appeals court found that witnesses in his trial might have been impermissibly affected by his immunized congressional testimony.[8] Because North had been granted limited immunity for his Congressional testimony, the law prohibited the independent counsel (or any prosecutor) from using that testimony as part of a criminal case against him. To prepare for the expected defense challenge that North's testimony had been used, the prosecution team had - before North's congressional testimony had been given - listed and isolated all its evidence[citation needed]; further, the individual members of the prosecution team had isolated themselves from news reports and discussion of North's testimony. While the defense could show no specific instance where any part of North's congressional testimony was used in his trial, the Court of Appeals ruled that the trial judge had made an insufficient examination of the issue, and ordered North's convictions reversed. The Supreme Court declined to review the case. After further hearings on the immunity issue, Judge Gesell dismissed all charges against North on September 16, 1991, on the motion of the independent counsel.

[edit] 1984 election
While the Sandinistas encouraged grassroots pluralism, they were perhaps less enthusiastic about national elections. They argued that popular support was expressed in the insurrection and that further appeals to popular support would be a waste of scarce resources.<sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-autogenerated6_61-0">[62] International pressure and domestic opposition eventually pressed the government toward a national election.<sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-autogenerated6_61-1">[62] Tomás Borge warned that the elections were a concession, an act of generosity and of political necessity.<sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-62">[63] On the other hand, the Sandinistas had little to fear from the election given the advantages of incumbency and the restrictions on the opposition, and they hoped to discredit the armed efforts to overthrow them.<sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-63">[64]

A broad range of political parties, ranging in political orientation from far-left to far-right, competed for power.<sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-64">[65] Following promulgation of a new populist constitution, Nicaragua held national elections in 1984. Independent electoral observers from around the world – including groups from the UN as well as observers from Western Europe – found that the elections had been fair.<sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-bbc19841105_65-0">[66] Several groups, however, disputed this: including UNO, a broad coalition of anti-Sandinista activists, COSEP, an organization of business leaders, the Contra group "FDN", organized by former Somozan-era National Guardsmen, landowners, businessmen, peasant highlanders, and what some claimed as their patron, the U.S. government.<sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-66">[67]

Although initially willing to stand in the 1984 elections, the UNO, headed by Arturo Cruz (a former Sandinista) declined participation in the elections based on their own objections to the restrictions placed on the electoral process by the State of Emergency and the official advisement of President Ronald Reagan's State Department, who feared that their participation would legitimize the election process. Among other parties that abstained was COSEP, who had warned the FSLN that they would decline participation unless freedom of the press was reinstituted. Coordinadora Democrática (CD) also refused to file candidates and urged Nicaraguans not to take part in the election, the Independent Liberal Party (PLI), headed by Virgilio Godoy Reyes announced its refusal to participate in October.<sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-SandinistaYears_67-0">[68] Consequently, when the elections went ahead the U.S. raised objections based upon political restrictions instituted by the State of Emergency (e.g. censorship of the press, cancellation of habeas corpus, and the curtailing of free assembly).

Daniel Ortega and Sergio Ramírez were elected president and vice-president, and the FSLN won an overwhelming 61 out of 96 seats in the new National Assembly, having taken 67% of the vote on a turnout of 75%.<sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-SandinistaYears_67-1">[68] Despite international validation of the elections by multiple political and independent observers (virtually all from among U.S. allies) the United States refused to recognize the elections, with President Ronald Reagan denouncing the elections as a sham. Daniel Ortega began his six-year presidential term on January 10, 1985. After the United States Congress turned down continued funding of the Contras in April 1985, the Reagan administration ordered a total embargo on United States trade with Nicaragua the following month, accusing the Sandinista government of threatening United States security in the region.<sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-SandinistaYears_67-2">[68]

[edit] 1990 election
Due to factors such as natural disasters, state corruption, the Contras, and inefficient economic policies, the state of the Nicaraguan economy declined.<sup class="Template-Fact" style="white-space: nowrap;" title="This claim needs references to reliable sources from March 2008">[citation needed] The elections of 1990, which had been mandated by the constitution passed in 1987, saw the Bush administration funnel $49.75 million of ‘non-lethal’ aid to the Contras, as well as $9m to the opposition UNO—equivalent to $2 billion worth of intervention by a foreign power in a US election at the time, and proportionately five times the amount George Bush had spent on his own election campaign.<sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-68">[69] <sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-69">[70] When Violetta Chamorro visited the White House in November 1989, the US pledged to maintain the embargo against Nicaragua unless Violeta Chamorro won.<sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-70">[71]

In August 1989, the month that campaigning began, the Contras redeployed 8,000 troops into Nicaragua, after a funding boost from Washington, becoming in effect the armed wing of the UNO, carrying out a violent campaign of intimidation. No fewer than 50 FSLN candidates were assassinated. The Contras also distributed thousands of UNO leaflets.

Years of conflict had left 50,000 casualties and $12b of damages in a society of 3.5m people and an annual GNP of $2b. The proportionately equivalent figures for the US would have been 5 million casualties and $25 trillion lost. After the war, a survey was taken of voters: 75.6% agreed that if the Sandinistas had won, the war would never have ended. 91.8% of those who voted for the UNO agreed with this. (William I Robinson, op cit)<sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-71">[72] The Library of Congress Country Studies on Nicaragua states:

[edit] Opposition (1990 - 2006)
In 1987, due to a stalemate with the Contras, the Esquipulas II treaty was brokered by Costa Rican President Óscar Arias Sánchez. The treaty's provisions included a call for a cease-fire, freedom of expression, and national elections. After the February 26, 1990 elections, the Sandinistas lost and peacefully passed power to the National Opposition Union (UNO), an alliance of 14 opposition parties ranging from the conservative business organization COSEP to Nicaraguan communists. UNO's candidate, Violeta Barrios de Chamorro, replaced Daniel Ortega as president of Nicaragua.

Reasons for the Sandinista loss in 1990 are disputed. Defenders of the defeated government assert that Nicaraguans voted for the opposition due to the continuing U.S. economic embargo and potential Contra threat. Opponents claim that Contra warfare had largely died down, and that the Sandinistas had grown increasingly unpopular, particularly due to forced conscription and crackdowns on political freedoms. An important reason, regardless of perspective, was that after a decade of the U.S. backed war and embargo, Nicaragua's economy and infrastructure were badly damaged and the United States promised aid only if the Sandinistas lost.<sup class="Template-Fact" style="white-space: nowrap;" title="This claim needs references to reliable sources from February 2007">[citation needed] The U.S. also helped keep the rightist factions united so there would not be two strong rightist candidates.

After their loss, most of the Sandinista leaders held most of the private property and businesses that had been confiscated and nationalized by the FSLN government. This process became known as the "piñata" and was tolerated by the new Chamorro government. Ortega also claimed to "rule from below" through groups he controls such as labor unions and student groups. Prominent Sandinistas also created a number of nongovernmental organizations to promote their ideas and social goals.<sup class="Template-Fact" style="white-space: nowrap;" title="This claim needs references to reliable sources from February 2007">[citation needed]

Daniel Ortega remained the head of the FSLN, but his brother Humberto resigned from the party and remained at the head of the Sandinista Army, becoming a close confidante and supporter of Chamorro. The party also experienced a number of internal divisions, with prominent Sandinistas such as Ernesto Cardenal and Sergio Ramírez resigning to protest what they described as heavy-handed domination of the party by Daniel Ortega. Ramírez also founded a separate political party, the Sandinista Renovation Movement (MRS); his faction came to be known as the renovistas, who favor a more social democratic approach than the ortodoxos, or hardliners. In the 1996 Nicaraguan election, Ortega and Ramírez both campaigned unsuccessfully as presidential candidates on behalf of their respective parties, with Ortega receiving 43% of the vote while Arnoldo Alemán of the Constitutional Liberal Party received 51%. The Sandinistas won second place in the congressional elections, with 36 of 93 seats.

Daniel Ortega was re-elected as leader of the FSLN in 1998. Municipal elections in November 2000 saw a strong Sandinista vote, especially in urban areas, and former Tourism Minister Herty Lewites was elected mayor of Managua. This significant result led to expectations of a close race in the presidential elections scheduled for November 2001. Daniel Ortega and Enrique Bolaños of the Constitutional Liberal Party (PLC) ran neck-and-neck in the polls for much of the campaign, but in the end the PLC won a clear victory. The results of these elections were that the FSLN won 42.6% of the vote for parliament (versus 52.6% for the PLC), giving them 41 out of the 92 seats in the National Assembly (versus 48 for the PLC). In the presidential race, Ortega lost to Bolaños 46.3% to 53.6%.

Daniel Ortega was once again re-elected as leader of the FSLN in March 2002 and re-elected as president of Nicaragua in November 2006.

[edit] 2006, back in government
In 2006, Daniel Ortega was elected president with 38% of the vote (see Nicaraguan general election, 2006). This occurred despite the fact that the breakaway Sandinista Renovation Movement continued to oppose the FSLN, running former Mayor of Managua Herty Lewites as its candidate for president. However, Lewites died just several month before the elections, and with him any hope of a true reform within the FSLN.

The ubiquitous Red and Black Sandinista flag was used during the election process along with the pink as it was one of the colours of a campaign that finished its popular appearances with John Lennon's Give Peace a Chance and the Sandinista Hymn "fighting against Yanqui agressors, enemies of humanity."

Any pretense of a change was dropped as soon as power was gained, the Red and Black flag is displayed once again in every public office.

The FSLN also won 38 seats in the congressional elections, becoming the party with the largest representation in parliament. The split in the Constitutionalist Liberal Party helped to allow the FSLN to become the largest party in Congress, however it should be noted that the Sandinista vote had a minuscule split between the FSLN and MRS, and that the liberal party combined is larger than the Frente Faction. In 2010, several liberal congressmen raised accusations about the FSLN presumably attempting to buy votes in order to pass constitutional reforms that would allow Ortega to run for office for the 6th time since 1984. <sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-72">[73]

[edit] "Zero Hunger project"
The "Zero Hunger Program", which aims to reduce poverty in the rural areas over a five-year period, was inaugurated by President Daniel Ortega and other members of his administration in the northern department of Jinotega. The program was designed to achieve the first objective of the United Nations' Millennium Development Goals, "to eradicate extreme poverty and reduce hunger to zero."

"Zero Hunger" with its budget of US$150 million plans to deliver a US$2,000 bond or voucher to 75,000 rural families between 2007 and 2012. The voucher will consist of the delivery of a pregnant cow and a pregnant sow, five chickens and a rooster, seeds, fruit- bearing plants and plants for reforestation.<sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-PL_73-0">[74] The project's short-term objective is to have each rural family capable of producing enough milk, meat, eggs, fruits, vegetables and cereals to cover its basic needs while its medium range objective is to establish local markets and export certain products.

The families that benefit from the project will be required to pay back 20 percent of the amount that they receive in order to create a rural fund that will guarantee the continuity of the program. NGOs and representatives from each community will be in charge of managing the project.

[edit] Aid cut off
Since the 2006 elections, Ortega has been condemned in Nicaragua and abroad due to what is regarded as efforts to dominate and control all branches of government.<sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-74">[75] The 2008 municipal elections, to which Ortega refused international monitoring have been condemned by many as fraudulent, and both European and US aid has been suspended. Two people were killed in post-election clashes.<sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-75">[76]

[edit] Ideologies
Main article: Sandinista IdeologiesThrough the media and the works of FSLN leaders such as Carlos Fonseca, the life and times of Augusto César Sandino became the unique symbol of this revolutionary force in Nicaragua. The ideology of Sandinismo gained momentum in 1974, when a Sandinista initiated hostage situation resulted in the Somoza government adhering to FSLN demands and publicly printing and airing work on Sandino in well known newspapers and media outlets.

During the long struggle against Somoza, the FSLN leaders' internal disagreements over strategy and tactics were reflected in three main factions: Nevertheless, while ideologies varied between FSLN leaders, all leaders essentially agreed that Sandino provided a path for the Nicaragua masses to take charge, and the FSLN would act as the legitimate vanguard. The extreme end of the ideology links Sandino to Roman Catholicism and portrays him as descending from the mountains in Nicaragua knowing he would be betrayed and killed. Generally however, most Sandinistas associated Sandino on a more practical level, as a heroic and honest person who tried to combat the evil forces of imperialist national and international governments that existed in Nicaragua's history.
 * The guerra popular prolongada (GPP, "prolonged popular war") faction was rural-based and sought long-term "silent accumulation of forces" within the country's large peasant population, which it saw as the main social base for the revolution.
 * The tendencia proletaria (TP, "proletarian tendency"), led by Jaime Wheelock, reflected an orthodox Marxist approach that sought to organize urban workers.
 * The tercerista/insurrecctionista (TI, "third way/insurrectionist") faction, led by Humberto and Daniel Ortega, was ideologically eclectic, favoring a more rapid insurrectional strategy in alliance with diverse sectors of the country, including business owners, churches, students, the middle class, unemployed youth and the inhabitants of shantytowns. The terceristas also helped attract popular and international support by organizing a group of prominent Nicaraguan professionals, business leaders, and clergymen (known as "the Twelve"), who called for Somoza's removal and sought to organize a provisional government from Costa Rica.

[edit] Principles of government
For purposes of making sense of how to govern, the FSLN drew four fundamental principles from the work of Carlos Fonseca and his understanding of the lessons of Sandino. According to Bruce E. Wright, “the Governing Junta of National Reconstruction agreed, under Sandinista leadership, that these principles had guided it in putting into practice a form of government that was characterized by those principles.”<sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-76">[77] It is generally accepted that these following principles have evolved the “ideology of Sandinismo.”<sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-77">[78] Three of these (excluding popular participation, which was presumably contained in Article 2 of the Constitution of Nicaragua) were to ultimately be guaranteed by Article 5 of the Constitution of Nicaragua. They are as follows:

1. Political Pluralism – The ultimate success of the Sandinista Front in guiding the insurrection and in obtaining the leading fore within it was based on the fact that the FSLN, through the tercerista guidance, had worked with many sectors of the population in defeating the Somoza dictatorship. The FSLN and all those whom would constitute the new provisional government were diverse; “they were plural in virtually all senses”.<sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-78">[79]

2. Mixed Economy – Fonseca’s understanding of the fact that Nicaragua was not, in spite of Browderist interpretations, simply a feudal country and that it had also never really developed its own capitalism surely made it clear that a simple feudalism-capitalism-socialism path was not a rational way to think about the future development of Nicaragua. It was not reasonable, nor was it responsible, to simply believe that the FSLN was the vanguard of the proletariat revolution. Everyone recognized that the proletariat was but a minor fraction of the population. A complex class structure in a revolution based on unity among people from various class positions suggested more that it made sense to see the FSLN as the “vanguard of the people”.

3. Popular Participation and Mobilization – This calls for more than simple representative democracy. The inclusion of the mass organizations in the Council of State clearly manifested this conception. In Article 2 of the Constitution this is spelled out as follows: “The people exercise democracy, freely participating and deciding in the construction of the economic, political and social system what is most appropriate to their interest. The people exercise power directly and by their means of their representatives, freely elected in accord with universal, equal, direct, free, and secret suffrage.”<sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-Palmer_109_79-0">[80]

4. International Non-alignment – This is a clear result of the fundamentally Bolivarist conceptions of Sandino as distilled through the modern understanding of Fonseca. It was clear that the U.S. government and large U.S. economic entities were a significant part of the problem for Nicaragua. But experiences with the traditional parties allied with the Soviet Union had also been unsatisfactory. Thus it was clear that Nicaragua must seek its own road.

It is widely accepted by many scholars<sup class="noprint Inline-Template" style="white-space: nowrap;" title="The material in the vicinity of this tag may use weasel words or too-vague attribution. from March 2009">[who?] that the period of the FSLN guiding the Nicaraguan revolution through the control of the state was a living experiment in an attempt to construct a truly democratic and revolutionary socialism. Bruce E. Wright claims that “this was a crucial contribution from Fonseca’s work that set the template for FSLN governance during the revolutionary years and beyond."